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LGBTQIA+ PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION CASES:
THE BATTLE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Jamie Reinah*
Protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans have greatly expanded since the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges,
but the debate about whether business owners can refuse to serve
LGBTQIA+ couples on religious grounds has grown more bitterly divided.
The free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right, and it is
strongly protected at both the federal and state levels. At the same time,
LGBTQIA+ couples are protected from receiving unequal treatment in
public places under state antidiscrimination laws.
The clash between religion and LGBTQIA+ rights has culminated in a
line of cases that present difficult questions for courts concerning the
balance between these competing interests. This Note discusses the battle
being waged between liberty and equality in these cases and argues that the
current legal doctrine exacerbates this inherent conflict. Ultimately, this
Note proposes a more streamlined test that state courts can utilize when
balancing business owners’ religious liberty interests against the state’s
interests in ensuring equality for LGBTQIA+ Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
Five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges,1 recognizing a constitutionally protected right to
same-sex marriage.2 Leading up to and following the Court’s decision,
various state and local governments passed new laws or revised existing
laws to protect members of the LGBTQIA+3 community from
discrimination in places of public accommodation.4 These recently enacted
public accommodation laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation5 and, in certain jurisdictions, marital status and gender identity.6
1. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
2. Id. at 679–81.
3. LGBTQIA+ is an acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex,
and asexual or ally. See Michael Gold, The ABCs of L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 7,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html [https://
perma.cc/KM6J-UJ2S]. The plus sign denotes all other gender and sexual identities not
represented by the other categories. Id.
4. A place of “public accommodation” is any business that provides goods or services
to members of the public. See infra Part I.B.2.
5. Currently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See State Public Accommodation Laws,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 25, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civiland-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx#NY6 [https://perma.cc/V79EPH7E]; see also, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (2021) (stating that public-facing
businesses shall not “directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person on
account of . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, or privileges of that public place”).
6. Currently, seventeen states have laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital
status, and twenty-three states have laws prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity.
See State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 5. In addition to sexual orientation, the

2021]

LGBTQIA+ PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION CASES

263

While the number of Americans supporting these public accommodation
laws7 has grown substantially,8 the debate about whether business owners
can refuse to serve LGBTQIA+ couples on religious grounds has
intensified.9 In his Obergefell dissent, Chief Justice Roberts anticipated
these rising tensions: “Hard questions [will] arise when people of faith
exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to
same-sex marriage . . . .”10
Religious business owners who have to choose between adhering to their
religious beliefs and serving LGBTQIA+ couples have brought
constitutional and state law claims seeking religious exemptions from state
antidiscrimination laws.11 For these business owners, providing goods and
services in connection with a same-sex wedding would be a deeply sinful
act.12 However, when LGBTQIA+ individuals are denied goods and
services, they suffer harm to their personhood and are deemed to be inferior

District of Columbia’s antidiscrimination laws include marital status and gender identity as
protected classes. Id.
7. This Note uses “public accommodation laws” and “antidiscrimination laws”
interchangeably.
8. A recent survey found that 72 percent of Americans favor laws that would protect
LGBTQIA+ Americans against discrimination in places of public accommodation. See
Broad Support for LGBT Rights Across All 50 States: Findings from the 2019 American
Values
Atlas,
PUB.
RELIGION
RSCH.
INST.
(Apr.
14,
2020),
https://www.prri.org/research/broad-support-for-lgbt-rights/#page-section-2
[https://perma.cc/U75A-GUTT].
9. See TJ Denley, Balancing Burdens in Religious Freedom Claims, 26 CARDOZO J.
EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 207, 209 (2020) (“What happens when two different views of
religion or morality are opposed? Which belief or morality—religion or equality—trumps
the other?”).
10. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 711 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also
Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common,
5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 209 (2010) (arguing that the recognition of same-sex marriage
will exacerbate the conflicts between LGBTQIA+ rights and religious liberty); Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 846 (“[T]he
biggest problem for religious liberty in our time is deep disagreements over sexual
morality . . . . [including] disagreements about . . . gay rights, and same-sex marriage.”).
11. This Note refers to these cases as “LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.” For a
more detailed explanation of religious exemptions, see infra Part I.A.
12. See Berg, supra note 10, at 215–16; see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for
Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.F.
369, 378 (2016); Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No.
16-111), 2017 WL 4005662, at *31 [hereinafter Brief of Christian Legal Society].
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members of society.13 Conceptions of liberty and equality are thus pitted
against each other in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.14
The conflict between liberty and equality in these cases is heightened due
to current religious exemption law.15 Because of its precedent in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,16 the Supreme Court has not fully weighed in on this conflict.17 This
was made clear in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.18 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a religious baker challenged the
application of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law, which would have
required him to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple in violation of
his sincerely held religious beliefs.19 While the Court decided the case in
favor of the baker on narrow free exercise grounds, it did not address the
broader questions about how to resolve conflicts between religious freedom
and LGBTQIA+ rights.20 To consider these questions, the Court would
have needed to revisit its holding in Smith; the Court was not explicitly
asked to do this in Masterpiece Cakeshop.21

13. See Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49,
65 (2018) (contending that the religious business owners and LGBTQIA+ couples both
suffer emotional harms); Debbie Munn, How It Feels When Someone Refuses to Make Your
Son a Wedding Cake, TIME (Oct. 27, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://time.com/4991839
/masterpiece-cakeshop-supreme-court-gay-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/2X3G-LCAM]
(“I still see today how that day changed their lives. When they walk into a store, there’s that
nagging feeling in the back of their mind telling them that this might be the day that they get
turned away again.”).
14. See Laycock, supra note 10, at 866 (“[W]hat one side views as a grave evil, the other
side views as a fundamental human right.”).
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Under Smith, religious claimants are not entitled to
exemptions from facially neutral laws of general applicability under the Free Exercise
Clause. See id. at 879. Antidiscrimination laws are neutral laws of general applicability. See
infra Part I.B.2.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
19. See id. at 1726. Because Smith precluded the baker from asserting a successful
religious exemption claim under the Free Exercise Clause, his main argument for an
exemption was on compelled speech grounds. See infra Part II.A.1. The baker also asserted
an as-applied discrimination claim under the Free Exercise Clause; this was the basis for the
Court’s decision. Id.
20. See Micah Schwartzman et al., Symposium: Religious Privilege in Fulton and
Beyond, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 2, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/11/symposium-religious-privilege-in-fulton-and-beyond/
[https://perma.cc/GE8XCW3M]; see also Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132
HARV. L. REV. 133, 134 (2018) (commenting on how the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop
avoided central questions in the case).
21. Following Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was presented with two other
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases involving wedding vendors but vacated the
judgments in both cases. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. (Arlene I), 389 P.3d 543 (Wash.
2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.); Klein v. Or. Bureau
of Lab. & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139
S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (mem.). As such, Smith remains the controlling free exercise authority in
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases. See Holly Hollman, Court Requires Religious
Exemption but Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2021, 3:02
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The Court, however, was presented with this exact question—whether to
revisit Smith—in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.22 In Fulton,
the City of Philadelphia declined to renew a contractual relationship with a
religious foster care agency that stated that it would certify same-sex
couples as foster parents.23 Although the foster care agency petitioned the
Court to reconsider its holding in Smith, the Court declined to do so.24
Instead, the Court followed a different line of free exercise cases and found
the government’s conduct to be unconstitutional.25 Thus, the Court
sidestepped a ripe opportunity to issue guidance on the broader conflict
between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.26
Because of Smith’s constitutional barrier, religious claimants also bring
religious exemption claims under state law.27 In many states, religious
exemption claims are subjected to the “compelling interest” test.28 When
applying the compelling interest test, there are disagreements among state
courts and scholars over the compelling interest served by
antidiscrimination laws and the extent to which the harm suffered by the
LGBTQIA+ couple should be factored into the analysis.29 Because of these
disagreements, state courts reach conflicting results, which exacerbate the
underlying conflict between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.30
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases are not going away; rather,
they are growing more frequent and more complex.31 As illustrated by
Fulton, these cases are expanding into other areas beyond wedding
vendors.32 Because these cases involve fundamental questions of how to
balance religious liberty against the government’s interest in protecting
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/court-requires-religious-exemption-but-leavesmany-questions-unanswered/ [https://perma.cc/WL7W-794P].
22. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
23. See id. at 1875–76.
24. See id. at 1877.
25. Id. at 1878, 1881.
26. See id. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
27. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing religious exemption claims brought under state
law).
28. See Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious
Freedom, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 715 (2019). Under the compelling interest test,
the government may substantially burden a person’s religious beliefs only if it has a
compelling interest in doing so and the burden is the least restrictive means of achieving its
compelling ends. Id. For a detailed discussion of the compelling interest test, see infra Parts
I.A, II.B.2.
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. See Movsesian, supra note 28, at 715–16.
31. See id. at 716; see also Hollman, supra note 21 (“But Fulton and Masterpiece have
done little to help lower courts, and the same conflicts will keep coming.”).
32. See, e.g., Gwen Aviles, Christian Day Care Center Rejects Child Because She Has
Lesbian Parents, NBC NEWS (July 22, 2019, 5:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/christian-day-care-center-rejects-child-because-she-has-lesbian-n1032466
[https://perma.cc/2V9G-FXSK] (discussing LGBTQIA+ discrimination in childcare); Tresa
Baldas, Pediatrician Won’t Treat Baby with 2 Moms, USA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2015, 7:06 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/18/doctor-discrimination-baby/
23642091/ [https://perma.cc/8TBM-XCB7] (discussing LGBTQIA+ discrimination in
healthcare); see also infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Fulton case).
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LGBTQIA+ rights, courts would benefit from having a more concrete
judicial framework when adjudicating these disputes. This Note proposes a
streamlined compelling interest test that state courts can use when faced
with claims for religious exemptions from state antidiscrimination laws.33
Part I lays out the clash between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights
in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases. Part I first introduces
religious liberty and the Free Exercise Clause and then discusses the
development of LGBTQIA+ civil rights and the expanded protections for
LGBTQIA+ Americans under antidiscrimination laws. Part II analyzes the
doctrinal challenges presented by current constitutional and statutory
religious exemption law and outlines the disagreements among state courts
over the analysis under the compelling interest test. To properly balance
the two competing interests in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases,
Part III proposes a judicial framework that calls for state courts to consider
the harms suffered by LGBTQIA+ couples when applying the compelling
interest test.
I. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND LGBTQIA+ CIVIL RIGHTS
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases symbolize the culmination of
the inherent clash between equality and religious liberty. This part provides
an overview of the key players in this conflict. Part I.A discusses religious
liberty and free exercise jurisprudence. Part I.B outlines the development
of LGBTQIA+ civil rights and the expanded role of state and local
governments in protecting these rights through antidiscrimination laws.
A. The First Amendment and Religious Liberty
Religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional right. The First
Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”34
More commonly known as the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
these provisions prohibit the government from compelling or punishing the
exercise of religious beliefs.35 Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
First Amendment’s protections are made applicable to state and local
governments.36

33. With Smith in place, this Note focuses on the compelling interest test under state
law. However, if the Supreme Court were to overrule Smith, the proposed framework would
be a workable standard for courts to use to analyze religious exemption claims under the
Free Exercise Clause. See infra Part III.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (“Government may neither compel
affirmation of a repugnant belief; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities . . . .” (citations omitted)).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
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The Supreme Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds
v. United States.37 Although free exercise law has changed since Reynolds,
there are two important groups of cases that dominate modern-day
jurisprudence. The first group deals with claims of government hostility
toward a religious group or practice.38 The second group deals with
claimants seeking religious exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability.39 In the first set of cases, the government targets or
disparately treats a certain religious group. The long-standing precedent in
this area is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.40
In Lukumi, members of a Florida church challenged a city ordinance that
prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals.41 The church practiced Santeria, a
West-African and Cuban religion that sacrifices animals as part of its
The Court declared the ordinance to be
ceremonial rituals.42
unconstitutional because it had a clear objective of prohibiting a religious
practice.43 The Court held that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is
not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of
scrutiny.”44 In other words, a law that is hostile toward or targets a
religious group or practice must withstand strict scrutiny to comply with the
First Amendment’s protections.45 The city was unable to meet this burden
and, therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the church.46
Cases like Lukumi where the government directly targets a specific
religious group or practice are rare.47 There are only a few other cases that
37. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court upheld a federal polygamy law and a criminal charge
against the defendant against his claim that he was exempt from complying with the criminal
code because of his religion. See id. at 166.
38. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
39. See generally Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
41. Id. at 528.
42. Id. at 524–25.
43. See id. at 545–46. While the church’s religious practices were subjected to the
ordinance, the conduct of other secular entities, such as restaurants, was not regulated. See
id. at 545.
44. Id. at 546.
45. See id. Strict scrutiny is one of three levels of review that courts will apply to
determine whether a law is constitutional. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 588 (6th ed. 2019). A law will be upheld under strict scrutiny if it
is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and if it is the least restrictive
means to achieve that interest. Id. at 588–89. This Note uses “strict scrutiny” and
“compelling interest test” interchangeably.
46. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47. The Supreme Court has also applied strict scrutiny
in cases where the government was found to have discriminated against religion generally,
as compared to the ordinances in Lukumi that specifically targeted the Santeria religion. See,
e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017)
(holding that Missouri’s refusal to provide a grant for playground resurfacing to a religious
daycare center on account of its religious status violated the Free Exercise Clause); Espinoza
v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (concluding that Montana’s
exclusion of parochial schools from its tuition assistance program violated the Free Exercise
Clause because the exclusion was based solely on the “religious character” of the schools).
47. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified
Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO.
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fall on the Lukumi side of the free exercise spectrum.48 However, the
principle from these cases is clear: when the government generally
disfavors a religious group or disparately treats a religious group, the
government can prevail only by showing that its conduct is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.49
The second group of free exercise cases deals with claims for religious
exemptions50 from neutral laws of general applicability.51 Unlike in
Lukumi, where the legislation intentionally targeted the Santeria religion, in
this group of cases, the legislation is neutral on its face but incidentally
burdens a religious group or practice when applied.52 Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith is the
controlling authority for these cases.53
In Smith, two members of a Native American church were terminated for
cause and deemed ineligible for unemployment compensation because of
their religious use of peyote, which was considered “misconduct” that
violated Oregon’s controlled substances law.54 Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the majority, rejected the contention that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a religious exemption under the Free Exercise Clause because

L. REV. 9, 29 (2001) (“[T]he Hialeah ordinances invalidated in [Lukumi] are rare examples
of . . . attempts by government to persecute disfavored religions . . . .”).
48. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729
(2018) (finding that state officials showed hostility toward the claimant’s religious beliefs).
49. The Lukumi test demands a showing by the state of an interest “of the highest order.”
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978));
see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[W]e know
this with certainty: when the government fails to act neutrally toward the free exercise of
religion, it . . . can prevail only if it satisfies strict scrutiny . . . .”).
50. A religious exemption is a “court ruling or statutory provision declaring that
otherwise valid regulations should not be applied in ways that significantly interfere with the
religious freedom of organizations or individuals.” Thomas C. Berg, Religious
Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 105 (2015). For
another insightful definition of religious exemptions, see Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 685, 686–87 (1992).
51. The government “fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant of
religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature.” Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (“[I]f the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation,
the law is not neutral.”). A law is not generally applicable “if it prohibits religious conduct
while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s interests in a similar
way.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877. Laws are also not generally applicable if they invite the
government “to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a
mechanism for individualized exemptions.’” Id. (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))); see
also Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions,
13 FIU L. REV. 667, 669 (2019) (describing a neutral law of general applicability as a
“nondiscriminatory” law that is not “regarding religion alone”).
52. See Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third
Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 457 (2014).
53. See Loewentheil, supra note 52 at 457–58.
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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“an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law.”55
Since the plaintiffs were challenging a neutral law of general
applicability that incidentally burdened their religious practices, the Court
concluded that it did not have to apply strict scrutiny.56 Instead, Justice
Scalia reasoned that a lower standard of scrutiny—rational basis review—
was the appropriate standard to apply.57
Before the Court reached its conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause
does not provide for exemptions from otherwise neutral and generally
applicable laws, the Court addressed a handful of pre-Smith religious
exemption cases. The first of these cases was Wisconsin v. Yoder.58 In
Yoder, the Court held that Wisconsin could not require Amish parents to
send their children to high school and granted the plaintiffs an exemption
from Wisconsin’s compulsory schooling law under the Free Exercise
Clause.59 In granting this exemption, the Court applied strict scrutiny.60
In Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished Yoder, characterizing the Amish
parents’ religious exemption claim as a “hybrid” rights claim.61 By
contrast, the Smith claimants based their religious exemption claim solely
on the Free Exercise Clause.62 Despite Justice Scalia’s attempt at
distinguishing Yoder, his hybrid-rights theory did not gain much traction,
and Yoder still stands essentially opposite Smith in the exemption bucket of
free exercise case law.63 Because Yoder has not officially been overturned,
it could present interesting questions should the Supreme Court ever decide
to reinstate heightened scrutiny for religious exemption claims under the
Free Exercise Clause.64
55. Id. at 878–79.
56. Id. at 885 (“To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon
the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is
compelling . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” (citation
omitted)).
57. See id. at 886 n.3. To satisfy the rational basis test, the government need only prove
that its legislative objective is related to a legitimate purpose. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
45, at 587.
58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. Id. at 234.
60. Id. at 214 (“[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth
grade . . . there [must be] a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”).
61. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see also Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868,
1915 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (“To dispose of Yoder, Smith was forced to invent yet
another special category of cases, those involving ‘hybrid-rights’ claims.”).
62. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
63. See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 573, 574 (2003) (noting how “hybrid rights claims have overwhelmingly failed to
succeed”); Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1918 (“The ‘hybrid rights’ exception, which was essential to
distinguish Yoder, has baffled the lower courts.”).
64. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1924 (arguing that the compelling interest test from Yoder
and Sherbert should replace Smith); see also Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock, Protecting
Free Exercise Under Smith and After Smith, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2021, 6:37 PM),
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In addition to Yoder, Justice Scalia wrestled with another group of free
exercise exemption cases: the “Sherbert Quartet.”65 In these cases, the
claimants terminated their existing employment for religious reasons66 and
were subsequently denied state unemployment benefits for “fail[ing],
without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when offered.”67
In all four cases, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and granted the
claimant’s request for a religious exemption, holding that the government
“could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an
individual’s willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion.”68
In Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished the Sherbert Quartet by noting that
the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law, whereas
peyote consumption was prohibited by controlled substance law in
Oregon.69 Moreover, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Sherbert Quartet
cases centered on individualized administrative determinations about what
constitutes “good cause” for not working.70 By contrast, the plaintiffs in
Smith violated the controlled substances law by ingesting peyote and, as a
result, were ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.71
In differentiating the Sherbert Quartet, Justice Scalia limited the
application of strict scrutiny to a specific subset of free exercise cases.72
Importantly, the Court in Fulton relied heavily on Justice Scalia’s
understanding of the Sherbert Quartet in holding that Pennsylvania officials
acted improperly when they refused to contract with a religious foster care
agency that stated it would not certify same-sex couples as foster parents.73

https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/protecting-free-exercise-under-smith-and-after-smith/
[https://perma.cc/L24D-SXMH] (same).
65. The “Sherbert Quartet” cases are: Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,
480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Prabha Sipi Bhandari,
The Failure of Equal Regard to Explain the Sherbert Quartet, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98–100
(1997) (discussing the Sherbert Quartet cases).
66. The claimants in Frazee, Hobbie, and Sherbert were required to work on their
Sabbath. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
In Thomas, the claimant was transferred to a department that produced parts for military
tanks, which violated his religious beliefs against the production of military weapons. See
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709.
67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401 (alteration in original).
68. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 (discussing the holdings of the Sherbert Quartet cases).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 884.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 885 (“We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in
accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [Sherbert] test inapplicable to
[the claimants’] challenges.”); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277–82 (1994) (elaborating on Justice Scalia’s understanding of the
Sherbert Quartet cases and their application to unemployment insurance cases).
73. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (2021) (“Like the good
cause provision in Sherbert, [the City’s standard foster care contract] incorporates a system
of individual exemptions, made available in this case at the ‘sole discretion’ of the
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The Court’s decision in Smith to adopt rational basis review—as opposed
to strict scrutiny—as the new standard for religious exemption cases
remains extremely controversial.74 In the aftermath of the Court’s decision,
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 199375
RFRA reinstated the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise
(RFRA).76
jurisprudence and provided that the government must satisfy strict scrutiny
when it substantially burdens77 religious exercise.78 Under RFRA, the
government must satisfy strict scrutiny “even if the burden [on religion]
results from a rule of general applicability.”79 The Supreme Court in City
of Boerne v. Flores,80 however, delivered a substantial blow to RFRA,
invalidating the law as applied to the states.81
In response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Person Act of 200082 (RLUIPA).83 Many states
followed suit, passing their own religious freedom restoration acts (“state
RFRAs”)84 or interpreting their constitutions to provide additional
Commissioner.”). By applying the Sherbert Quartet cases in Fulton, the Court left Smith
intact. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the Court’s narrow ruling in Fulton).
74. Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1990) (concluding that the Free
Exercise Clause permits the granting of religious exemptions), with Phillip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 915, 916–17 (1992) (arguing, in line with Smith, against religious exemptions to
neutral and generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause).
75. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
76. See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 163 (2016).
77. In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, religious claimants can typically show
that their religious beliefs are substantially burdened because they are being forced to choose
between acting contrary to their faith or violating antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Brush &
Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 920–21 (Ariz. 2019). This Note does not
address the separate area of legal scholarship that closely reviews the substantial burden
component under RFRA and similar state laws. See generally Abner S. Greene, Religious
Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
161 (2015).
78. “The purposes of this chapter are . . . to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)
(citations omitted).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a); see, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682, 688–89 (2014) (applying strict scrutiny to evaluate the claimant’s claim under RFRA).
80. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
81. See id. at 536. RFRA, as applied to the federal government, stands. See Lund, supra
note 76, at 164.
82. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5).
83. See Lund, supra note 76, at 163–64. RLUIPA protects religious institutions and
houses of worship from discrimination in land use and zoning laws. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a). RLUIPA also protects institutionalized persons from religious discrimination.
Id. § 2000cc-1(a).
84. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164; State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 14, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/9AG5-4P6U].
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protections for religious freedom.85 Echoing RFRA and RLUIPA, state
RFRAs call for strict scrutiny review when the state substantially burdens
religion.86 As a result, “the compelling-interest test discarded by Smith
now again applies to the federal government and more than half the
states.”87 The relationship between state RFRAs and Smith is one part of a
multi-faceted battle in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.88
B. Expanding Protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans
LGBTQIA+ civil rights stand directly opposite religious liberty in
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.89 As a result of Supreme Court
decisions and changes to state and local antidiscrimination laws,
LGBTQIA+ civil rights have greatly expanded since the turn of the
century.90 First, this section discusses the important role the Supreme
Court has played in expanding LGBTQIA+ civil rights. Second, this
section addresses how state governments have promoted equality for
LGBTQIA+ Americans by increasing the protections afforded by
antidiscrimination laws.
1. The Supreme Court and LGBTQIA+ Constitutional Rights
Since the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court has heard only a few cases
addressing the constitutional rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals, but the
Court’s decisions have been significant.91 In 1996, the Court was presented
with the question of whether an amendment to Colorado’s state
constitution, which rolled back municipal protections for LGBTQIA+
individuals, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.92
The Court applied rational basis review93 and concluded that the
amendment was unconstitutional.94

85. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164. Alabama is one of the states that has broadly
construed the religious freedom protections in its state constitution. See ALA. CONST. art. I,
§ 3.01.
86. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 2018)
(“No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is . . . [e]ssential to further a
compelling governmental interest; and . . . [t]he least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (outlining RFRA’s
legislative purpose).
87. Lund, supra note 76, at 164; see also Victoria Cappucci, Note, The Cost of Free
Speech: Resolving the Wedding Vendor Divide, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2585, 2592–93 (2020)
(discussing the implications of RFRA, RLUIPA, and state RFRAs).
88. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
89. See Lydia E. Lavelle, Saving Cake for Dessert: How Hearing the LGBTQ Title VII
Cases First Can Inform LGTBQ Public Accommodation Cases, 30 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
123, 123–24 (2020).
90. See id. at 123, 144.
91. See id. at 123.
92. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–25 (1996).
93. In addressing constitutional questions related to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court uses the same standards of constitutional review applied in the First Amendment cases
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LGBTQIA+ Americans secured another victory at the Supreme Court in
2003. In Lawrence v. Texas,95 the Court held that state laws that
criminalized private consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults
were unconstitutional.96 Ten years later in United States v. Windsor,97 the
Court struck down the definition of marriage in the Defense of Marriage
Act98 (DOMA) as unconstitutional.99 DOMA defined marriage as the
“legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”100 In
reaching its decision, the Court noted that “[u]nder DOMA, same-sex
married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree,
in visible and public ways.”101
In 2015, the Court took a monumental step in recognizing a
constitutionally protected right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v.
Hodges.102 The Court declared that the denial to same-sex couples of the
fundamental right to marry “works a grave and continuing harm” and
imposes a “disability” that subordinates same-sex couples.103 The Court
solidified this right to same-sex marriage in Pavan v. Smith104 when it held
that both members of a same-sex couple have a constitutional right to have
both of their names listed on their child’s birth certificate.105
Despite having addressed constitutional questions about LGBTQIA+
rights only a handful of times, the Supreme Court’s decisions have greatly
shaped and expanded protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans.106 As the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to provide more substantive
rights to LGBTQIA+ Americans, state and local governments have
followed suit and looked to expand equality for the LGBTQIA+ community
in their jurisdictions.
2. Public Accommodation Laws: New Protected Classes
Following the Supreme Court’s example, state and local governments
have taken important steps to expand protections for LGBTQIA+
Americans, mainly through the passage of new or revised public
discussed above. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of
rational basis review).
94. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else.”).
95. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
96. See id. at 578–79. The Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a
prior decision approving of such laws. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578l.
97. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
98. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1
and 28 U.S.C.).
99. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
100. 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
101. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772.
102. 576 U.S. 644, 679–81 (2015).
103. Id. at 675.
104. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam).
105. See id. at 2078–79.
106. See Lavelle, supra note 89, at 124.
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accommodation laws.107 Historically, public accommodation laws have
prohibited discrimination on the basis of the protected classes of race,
religion, and national origin.108 To expand protections for the LGBTQIA+
community, state109 and local110 governments have enlarged the list of
protected classes to include sexual orientation and, in some places, gender
identity.111 Federal public accommodation law—namely Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964112 (“Civil Rights Act”)—does not include sexual
orientation as a protected class.113 Because there is currently no federal law
that prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in places of public
accommodation,114 the passage of legislation by state and local
governments has been significant.115
107. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws,
60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 638–39 (2016).
108. See id. at 635; see also Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson,
Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public
Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 260–61 (1978),
https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Lisa-Lerman-AnnetteSanderson_RLSC_7.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZFT-BPTN].
109. See State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 5 (listing California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin as jurisdictions that have
broadened the range of protected classes). While Michigan has not officially amended its
public accommodation law, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission interpreted “sex” in the
state’s current law as covering sexual orientation and gender identity. See, e.g.,
Interpretative Statement Regarding the Meaning of “Sex” in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act (Act 453 of 1976), MICH. C.R. COMM’N, https://www.michigan.gov/
documents/mdcr/MCRC_Interpretive_Statement_on_Sex_05212018_625067_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GL97-LN5J] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (interpretive statement adopted on
May 21, 2018).
110. As of January 2018, more than 400 cities and counties have laws in place protecting
LGBTQIA+ Americans from discrimination in places of public accommodation. See Klint
W. Alexander, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision and the Clash Between
Nondiscrimination and Religious Freedom, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1069, 1093 (2019) (citing
Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances That Include Gender Identity,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-nondiscrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender [https://perma.cc/JPY3-U77U] (last visited
Aug. 9, 2021)).
111. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 635–36, 638.
112. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
113. See Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer Access Rights: Creating
Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
781, 784 (2013); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (prohibiting discrimination “on the ground of
race, color, religion, [and] national origin”).
114. The Supreme Court recently interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. See Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). The Court’s decision expanded employment
protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans but did not address the question of discrimination in
places of public accommodation.
115. Congress is currently considering a bill known as the Equality Act, which would
greatly expand antidiscrimination protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans at the federal level.
See H.R. 5, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5
[https://perma.cc/BK7W-6VLA] (“This bill prohibits discrimination based on sex, sexual
orientation, and gender identity in areas including public accommodations . . . .”). The
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Drafters of antidiscrimination laws originally used “public
accommodation” to refer to places “other than schools, workplaces, and
homes.”116 Statutory definitions of public accommodation have broadened
over time and reflect one of three basic models.117 The first model is
unique to Title II of the Civil Rights Act, which provides an exclusive list
of businesses subject to antidiscrimination obligations.118 The second
model defines public accommodation generally.119 The third model bridges
the gap between the first two and usually contains some type of exclusive
list, plus a catch-all provision.120 Regardless of the model used, in most
states, virtually every entity open to the public constitutes a public
Public
accommodation, and there are limited exceptions.121
accommodation laws are neutral and generally applicable laws.122
The overall purpose of public accommodation laws has been fiercely
debated,123 and in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, the question is
Some scholars argue that the purpose of
an important one.124
antidiscrimination law is to expand market access to protected persons who
historically have not been able to fully enjoy the goods and services of a
functioning market.125 Others dispute this position, acknowledging that
House passed the Equality Act on February 25, 2021, and the Senate is considering the bill.
See Grace Segers, Senate Could Expand LGBTQ Protections with Equality Act, CBS NEWS
(June 10, 2021, 8:50 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/equality-act-lgbtq-protectionbill-senate/ [https://perma.cc/DW4Y-44FA].
116. Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 108, at 217.
117. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 639.
118. Id. at 639–40; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (listing lodgings, eating establishments, gas
stations, and places of exhibition or entertainment as the categories of public
accommodations).
119. Sepper, supra note 107, at 640. For example, a public accommodation is “any place,
store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies accommodations,
good and services . . . .” Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7) (2015)).
120. Id. at 641–42. For example, Maine’s public accommodation law contains a list of
specific categories of public accommodations, followed by a broad definition encompassing
“[a]ny establishment that . . . offers its goods . . . to . . . the general public.” Id. at 642
(alteration in original) (quoting ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (1995)).
121. Id. at 642.
122. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727
(2018) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per
curiam)) (“[I]t is a general rule that . . . [religious] objections do not allow business owners
and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to
goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”).
For a general discussion of neutral and generally applicable laws, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
123. Compare Berg, supra note 50, at 141–42 (arguing that there are plenty of vendors
available to ensure that LGBTQIA+ individuals gain access to the market as a whole), with
Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity?: Religious Exemptions to
Public Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 705, 711 (2014) (arguing that the concept of
dignity is extremely relevant to the current debate over protecting LGBTQIA+ individuals
from discrimination).
124. See infra Part II.C.1.
125. See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 133
(2006) (“Anyone who wants to extend antidiscrimination protection to a new class needs to
show that the class is subject to discrimination that is so pervasive that markets will not
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while public accommodation laws address the problem of market access,
the fundamental purpose of these laws is to dismantle patterns of
discrimination and ensure human dignity.126
The various aims of antidiscrimination laws have posed challenges for
courts in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, particularly when
courts are applying strict scrutiny to determine whether a religious
exemption should be granted under state law.127 To balance the liberty and
equality interests in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases more
efficiently, courts should consider the government’s goals in enacting
antidiscrimination laws.128
II. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION LAW
As previously discussed, public-facing businesses are prohibited under
public accommodation laws from discriminating on the basis of protected
classes, including sexual orientation, in many jurisdictions.129 LGBTQIA+
public accommodation cases demonstrate the inherent tension between
liberty and equality when a religious business owner denies services to a
same-sex couple in violation of public accommodation law.130 While these
conflicts existed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell,131 the
number of cases rose substantially following the Court’s decision in that
case.132
Because of Smith, the Supreme Court has not fully weighed in on the
core conflict present in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.133 As a
result, state courts have needed to reconcile the competing interests in these
solve the problem.”); see also Nathan Oman, The Empirical Irony of the Conflict Between
Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom, L. & RELIGION F. (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://lawandreligionforum.org/2015/04/22/the-empirical-irony-of-the-conflict-betweenantidiscrimination-and-religious-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/7S32-959X].
126. See Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 129, 153–54 (2015); see also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2574–78
(2015); Lim & Melling, supra note 123, at 713 (“The primary purpose . . . is to solve this
problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access
to public establishments.” (omission in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370
(1964))).
127. See infra Part II.C.
128. See infra Part III.A.
129. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the expanded protections for LGBTQIA+
Americans under state antidiscrimination laws).
130. See infra Part II.A.1.
131. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell and other cases involving
LGBTQIA+ constitutional rights, see supra Part I.B.1.
132. See Sepper, supra note 126, at 146 (“2014 and 2015 . . . have seen renewed efforts to
achieve marriage-related religious exemptions for businesses.”); see also Berg, supra note
10, at 209; Alexander, supra note 110, at 1106 (“Since the 2015 Obergefell decision, U.S.
courts have been working to strike the right balance between the promotion
of LGBT equality and the protection of religious liberty . . . .”).
133. See Hollman, supra note 21 (arguing that the Supreme Court has not addressed
“whether and under what circumstances the Constitution requires an exemption to . . .
nondiscrimination law more broadly”).
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cases under state law; this has led to inconsistent results and intensified the
underlying divide in these cases.134 Part II.A explores the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases. Part II.B delves
into the challenges presented by the current body of religious exemption
law by examining Smith and state RFRAs more closely. Part II.C outlines
the disagreements among courts and scholars about the overall purpose
public accommodation laws serve, as well as the applicability of the
third-party harm doctrine.
A. The Supreme Court and LGBTQIA+ Public Accommodation Cases
While the Supreme Court has previously heard LGBTQIA+ public
accommodation cases, it has not addressed the underlying clash between
liberty and equality in these cases.135 To reach these broader questions, the
Court would need to reconsider its holding in Smith, which it was not
specifically asked to do until Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.136 Part II.A.1
explains the Court’s decisions in the “wedding vendor” cases.137 Part
II.A.2 discusses the Court’s missed opportunity in Fulton to address the
conflict between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights in foster care.
1. The Wedding Vendor Cases
The most well-known LGBTQIA+ public accommodation case to reach
the Supreme Court is Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission. In this case, Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece
Cakeshop and a devout Christian, refused to make a wedding cake for a
same-sex couple, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins.138 After being denied
by Phillips, the couple filed an administrative complaint with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission (the “Commission”).139 The Commission found
that Phillips violated Colorado’s public accommodation law, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.140 Phillips
challenged the antidiscrimination law as applied to his conduct of denying
the couple services, claiming that the law’s application violated his First
Amendment free exercise and speech rights.141 The Colorado Court of
Appeals disagreed with Phillips and upheld the Commission’s ruling.142

134. See infra Part II.B.2.
135. See Hollman, supra note 21; see also Movsesian, supra note 28, at 713.
136. 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021).
137. Since most LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases involve a religious business
owner refusing to provide goods and services for a same-sex wedding, scholars have coined
the term “wedding vendor” to characterize these specific cases. See, e.g., Laycock, supra
note 13, at 50–51. However, since these cases are expanding beyond wedding vendors, the
term “wedding vendor” is no longer all-inclusive. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
139. Id. at 1725.
140. Id. at 1726.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1726–27.
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Phillips’s
constitutional claims.143 Phillips presented the Court with three questions:
(1) whether the Commission impermissibly targeted his religious beliefs in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause; (2) whether he was entitled to an
exemption under the Free Speech Clause; and (3) whether he was entitled to
a religious exemption under the Free Exercise Clause.144 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals’s decision and
concluded that the state violated Phillips’s free exercise rights when it
failed to provide “neutral and respectful consideration” of his religious
beliefs.145 The Court did not discuss Phillips’s request for a religious
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause and only briefly considered his
compelled speech exemption claim.146 Instead, the Court focused nearly all
of its attention on the Commission’s conduct during its administrative
review of Phillips’s case.147
The Court scrutinized commentary made by two commissioners equating
Phillips’s views regarding same-sex marriage to historical instances where
religion was used to justify violence and oppression.148 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, described this conduct as exhibiting “elements of
clear and impermissible hostility” toward Phillips’s religious beliefs.149
Turning to Lukumi, the Court concluded that the Commission’s treatment of
Phillips’s religious beliefs violated the guarantee of neutrality toward
religion that the Free Exercise Clause requires.150
To consider Phillips’s claim for a religious exemption under the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court would have needed to address its controversial

143. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.).
144. Brief for Petitioner at 14–16, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762, at *14–17. Because Smith arguably
stood in the way of Phillips’s most obvious claim for a religious exemption, a majority of the
briefing in the case focused on his compelled speech argument. Id. at 16–35.
Unsurprisingly, many claimants in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases also present
compelled speech claims. See, e.g., Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v.
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 479 F. Supp. 3d 543, 548 (W.D. Ky. 2020); State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. (Arlene II), 441 P.3d 1203, 1224–28 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, No.
19-333, 2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.). While these compelled speech
claims present interesting questions, this Note does not specifically address these issues.
145. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
146. Justice Thomas closely analyzed Phillips’s compelled speech claim in his concurring
opinion. See id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 1729–30 (majority opinion); see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra
note 20, at 133 (observing that the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop “focused on whether state
officials treated religious objections with the proper respect and consideration”).
148. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. During Phillips’s administrative hearing,
a commissioner stated that “[f]reedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the
holocaust . . . .” Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Colo. C.R. Comm’n
Meeting (May 30, 2014)).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1730–31 (discussing the application of Lukumi).
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holding in Smith.151 While some members of the Court have suggested in
other contexts that the Court should reconsider Smith,152 the Court was not
presented with this specific question in Masterpiece Cakeshop.153 The
Court, therefore, did not reach the underlying free exercise exemption
issues.154 Notably, the Court acknowledged the inherent clash between
liberty and equality but did not explicitly address the question of how to
balance these interests.155
After Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was presented with two other
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases involving wedding vendors. In
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.156 (Arlene I), Barronelle Stutzman, the
owner of Arlene’s Flowers, refused to sell wedding flowers to a same-sex
couple, Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed.157 Stutzman requested an
exemption from Washington’s antidiscrimination law, but her request was
denied by the state courts.158 Stutzman then petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear her constitutional claims.159
Similarly, in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries,160
Christian bakers Melissa and Aaron Klein refused to make a wedding cake
for Rachel and Laurel Bowman-Cryer, a same-sex couple.161 The Oregon
state courts upheld the Bureau of Labor and Industries’s administrative

151. See supra Part I.A (discussing Smith and its aftermath). In his concurring opinion in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that Smith “remains controversial in
many quarters.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
152. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019). In a concurring statement on the denial of certiorari, Justice
Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, observed that the Court’s ruling
in Smith “drastically cut back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause,” but in
this particular case, the Court “ha[s] not been asked to revisit [Smith].” Id. at 637.
153. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 14–16.
154. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 133–34; see also Movsesian, supra
note 28, at 713 (arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop “does relatively little to resolve the
conflict between anti-discrimination laws and the right of business owners to decline, out of
sincere religious conviction, to provide services in connection with same-sex weddings”);
Alexander, supra note 110, at 1070.
155. Justice Kennedy opened the Court’s opinion by recognizing the difficult questions
related to the “proper reconciliation” of a state’s authority to protect LGBTQIA+ Americans
from discrimination “when they seek goods or services” and the right of “all persons to
exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138
S. Ct. at 1723. Justice Kennedy closed the Court’s opinion with the following statement:
“[T]hese disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere
religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and
services in an open market.” Id. at 1732.
156. 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018)
(mem.).
157. Id. at 549.
158. Id. at 551, 568–69.
159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–5, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138
S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 17-108), 2017 WL 3126218, at *1–5.
160. 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2713
(2019) (mem.).
161. Id. at 1057. Rachel was “hysterical” when Klein told her that they do not make
cakes for same-sex weddings. Id.

280

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

ruling that the Kleins violated Oregon’s public accommodation law.162
Like Stutzman and Phillips, the Kleins sought review by the U.S. Supreme
Court.163 In both cases, the Court vacated the judgments, directing the state
courts to reconsider their decisions in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.164 As
such, the Court did not address the broader free exercise issues.
2. Foster Care: The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity
In its October 2020 term, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, an LGBTQIA+ public accommodation case
involving a new challenger, a religious foster care agency.165 The Fulton
case presented the Court with the specific question about whether to
reconsider Smith, but it sidestepped a ripe opportunity to address the clash
between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.166
In Fulton, Catholic Social Services (CSS)167 challenged the Fair
Practices Ordinance,168 Philadelphia’s public accommodation law, on the
grounds that the law, as applied, violates its rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.169 CSS is one of thirty agencies that contracts with the City of
Philadelphia to provide foster and adoption services.170 CSS’s contract
with the city contained language specifically incorporating the Fair
Practices Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual

162. See id. at 1087.
163. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct.
2713 (2019) (No. 18-547), 2018 WL 5308156, at *15.
164. See generally Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019);
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). On remand from the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its judgment and denied
Stutzman a religious exemption. See Arlene II, 441 P.3d 1203, 1209–10 (Wash. 2019), cert.
denied, No. 19-333, 2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.). The court pointed out
that the Supreme Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop “did not reconcile” the principles of free
exercise of religion and the government’s interest in protecting LGBTQIA+ rights. Id. at
1215. Stutzman filed another petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333, 2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021)
(mem.).
165. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (2021). Many scholars
foreshadowed the emergence of these new types of cases. See Berg, supra note 10, at 211.
These new conflicts with foster care and adoption agencies are intensifying. See, e.g., Buck
v. Gordon, 959 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2020); New Home Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 387
F. Supp. 3d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2019), rev’d, 966 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020).
166. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“A majority of our colleagues,
however, seek to sidestep the question [of whether to overrule Smith].”).
167. CSS is a religious nonprofit organization affiliated with the Archdiocese of
Philadelphia. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141
S. Ct. 1868 (2021). CSS has been serving the Philadelphia community since 1917 and views
its foster care work as part of its “religious mission.” Id.
168. PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1101 (2021).
169. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 152.
170. Id. at 147. When a child in need of foster care comes into the city’s custody, the
Department of Health and Human Services refers that child to one of the agencies with
which it has a contractual relationship, such as CSS. Id.
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orientation in places of public accommodation.171 Therefore, CSS was
required to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, a practice CSS
argued violated its sincerely held religious beliefs.172
The Department of Health and Human Services (“Human Services”)
opened an investigation into CSS after the Philadelphia Inquirer reported
that CSS “would not work with same-sex couples as foster parents.”173
After several attempts to resolve the underlying conflict, Human Services
notified CSS that it would no longer make referrals to CSS or enter into
future contracts with the agency unless CSS assured it would certify
same-sex couples as foster parents.174 CSS, along with three of its foster
parents—Sharonell Fulton, Cecilia Paul, and Toni Lynn Simms-Busch—
filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief.175 The district court
denied the agency’s request for injunctive relief,176 and the Third Circuit
upheld the decision on appeal.177
The Third Circuit focused its inquiry on whether Human Services’s
administrative investigation inappropriately targeted CSS’s religious
beliefs.178 In support of its claim that the city acted out of religious
hostility, CSS pointed to statements made by Human Services
Commissioner Cynthia Figueroa about “following the teachings of Pope
Francis.”179 While CSS characterized this commentary as improper, the
court found that there was no evidence that “the City treated CSS
differently because of its religion.”180
171. Id. at 148. In addition to incorporating the Fair Practices Ordinance, CSS’s contract
contained standalone antidiscrimination provisions. Id. The Supreme Court closely analyzed
these contractual provisions in its decision. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct.
1868, 1878–80 (2021).
172. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 147–49.
173. Id. at 148; see Julia Terruso, Two Foster Agencies in Philly Won’t Place Kids with
LGBTQ People, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 13, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/
philly/news/foster-adoption-lgbtq-gay-same-sex-philly-bethany-archdiocese-20180313.html
[https://perma.cc/2HT8-RM77].
174. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 150.
175. Id. at 150–51. CSS also requested a religious exemption to the city’s
antidiscrimination policies under the Free Exercise Clause and filed a Masterpiece
Cakeshop-type claim alleging that Human Services impermissibly targeted its religious
beliefs. See id. at 156–57.
176. Id. at 151.
177. Id. at 165.
178. Id. at 156. The Third Circuit dismissed CSS’s argument that the city’s
antidiscrimination policies are not neutral and generally applicable. See id. at 158 (“The Fair
Practices Ordinance has not been gerrymandered as in Lukumi . . . .”). The Supreme Court
disagreed. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (holding that the
city’s actions are subject to ‘the most rigorous of scrutiny’” (quoting Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993))).
179. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 157.
180. Id. In this regard, the Third Circuit’s decision closely mirrors Masterpiece
Cakeshop. Although Jack Phillips asserted an exemption claim under the Free Exercise
Clause and Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court did not extensively consider his
exemption claims because of Smith. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. Instead, the
Court’s decision centered on the state’s hostility toward Phillips’s religious beliefs, which is
conduct barred by the Free Exercise Clause. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
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Following the Third Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear CSS’s constitutional claims.181 In its briefing, CSS
explicitly presented the Court with the question of whether Smith should be
revisited.182 With the Smith question teed up, the Court had an opportunity
to consider the true conflict in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases but
“[d]odg[ed] the question.”183 Instead, the Court concluded that “[t]his case
falls outside Smith because the City has burdened the religious exercise of
CSS through policies that do not meet the requirement of being neutral and
generally applicable.”184
The Court closely scrutinized a provision of CSS’s contract that provides
the Human Services commissioner with discretionary authority to grant
exceptions from the city’s antidiscrimination policies.185 Relying on the
Sherbert Quartet, the Court concluded that the “inclusion of a formal
system of entirely discretionary exceptions . . . renders the contractual
nondiscrimination requirement not generally applicable.”186 The Court
proceeded to apply strict scrutiny and concluded that the city failed to
demonstrate a compelling reason for denying CSS a religious exemption.187
Because the Court in Fulton sidestepped the question of whether to
overrule Smith, it missed a ripe opportunity to resolve the ongoing conflict
181. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020).
182. Brief for Petitioners at 37–50, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020)
(No. 19-123), 2020 WL 2836494, at *37–52. CSS also asked the Court to consider whether
the city’s antidiscrimination policies are neutral and generally applicable. See id. at 20–30,
2020 WL 2836494, at *23–30.
183. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see
also id. at 1888 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Not only is the Court’s decision unlikely to resolve
the present dispute, it provides no guidance regarding similar controversies in other
jurisdictions.”).
184. Id. at 1877 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“[T]he
government contract at issue provides for individualized exemptions from its
nondiscrimination rule, thus triggering strict scrutiny . . . . I therefore see no reason to
decide in this case whether Smith should be overruled, much less what should replace it.”).
185. Id. at 1878 (majority opinion). Section 3.21 of CSS’s foster care contract provides,
in relevant part, that CSS “shall not reject . . . prospective foster or adoptive parents . . .
based upon . . . their . . . sexual orientation . . . unless an exception is granted by the
Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole discretion.” Id.
186. Id. The Court adopted Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Sherbert Quartet from
Smith: “[T]he unemployment benefits law in Sherbert was not generally applicable because
the ‘good cause’ standard permitted the government to grant exemptions based on the
circumstances underlying each application.” Id. at 1877 (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum.
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)); see also supra Part 1.A (discussing the Sherbert
Quartet).
187. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881–82. Separately, the Court concluded that the Fair
Practices Ordinance does not apply to foster care certification services. Id. at 1880.
According to the Court, “[c]ertification as a foster parent . . . is not readily accessible to the
public” and, therefore, does not constitute a public accommodation. Id. But see id. at 1927
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that foster agencies, like public colleges and universities,
qualify as public accommodations under the Fair Practices Ordinance despite engaging in
“customized and selective assessment[s]”). Importantly, as Justice Alito observed, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law is not binding on state courts. See id. at 1887
n.21 (Alito, J., concurring). In other words, the majority’s characterization of foster care
certification services is not binding precedent. Id.
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between expanded LGBTQIA+ rights and religious liberty in LGBTQIA+
public accommodation cases.188
B. Religious Exemption Doctrine: A Patchwork of Problems
With the Supreme Court providing limited guidance on how to address
the conflicts in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, lower courts have
tackled the challenging issues independently.189 The results have been
inconsistent. Exemptions have been denied in most cases190 but granted in
others.191 These inconsistencies are a product of current religious
exemption law.192 Because Smith effectively blocks a religious claimant’s
request for an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause, lower courts are
frequently presented with compelled speech claims, and some have
explicitly admitted that they are unsure what framework to apply.193 As it
stands now, the doctrinal framework in place—Smith for constitutional
exemption claims and the compelling interest test under state RFRAs—is a
poor fit to balance both the liberty and equality interests in LGBTQIA+

188. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Dodging the [Smith] question today
guarantees it will recur tomorrow. These cases will keep coming until the Court musters the
fortitude to supply an answer.”).
189. See generally Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz.
2019).
190. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 75 (N.M. 2013) (holding
that a wedding photographer was not entitled to a religious exemption because, under Smith,
New Mexico’s antidiscrimination law is neutral and generally applicable); Gifford v.
McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (holding that a wedding catering
hall was not entitled to a religious exemption because, under Smith, New York’s
antidiscrimination law is neutral and generally applicable); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 385
F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1162–63 (D. Colo. 2019) (holding that a wedding website designer was
not entitled to a religious exemption because, under Smith, Colorado’s antidiscrimination
law is neutral and generally applicable), aff’d No. 19-1413, 2021 WL 3157635 (10th Cir.
July 26, 2021).
191. See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 927. The Arizona Supreme Court granted the
designers of custom wedding invitations a religious exemption under Arizona’s state RFRA.
Id.; see also Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t,
479 F. Supp. 3d 543, 565 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (allowing the claimant to proceed on her
compelled speech exemption claim but opting not to address the free exercise claim likely
because of Smith); Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 760 (8th Cir. 2019)
(permitting the claimant’s free exercise exemption claim to proceed on a hybrid rights theory
in conjunction with compelled speech).
192. Scholars on both sides of the liberty-versus-equality debate have alluded to the
inconsistencies in religious exemption law. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10, at 845
(characterizing religious exemption law as a “confusing and rather ragtag body of law”);
Movsesian, supra note 28, at 715–16 (noting that religious exemption law is “currently
something of a patchwork”).
193. See, e.g., Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Housing v. Miller, No. BCV-17-102855, 2018 WL
747835, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2018). The court denied the claimant’s request for an
exemption from California’s antidiscrimination law but on compelled speech grounds. The
court observed that “[i]t is difficult to say what standard of scrutiny . . . should [be] use[d] to
evaluate the application of the Free Exercise clause to the circumstances of this case after
[Smith].” Id.
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public accommodation cases.194 Part II.B.1 discusses the challenges
presented by Smith. Part II.B.2 outlines the obstacles created by statutory
religious exemption law, specifically focusing on state RFRAs.
1. The Smith Hurdle
The Supreme Court in Smith held that “generally applicable,
religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious
practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”195
As previously discussed, the Court adopted rational basis review as the
level of scrutiny applicable to religious exemption claims under the Free
Exercise Clause.196 Following Smith, compelling interest review is only
warranted when a law lacks neutrality or is not generally applicable.197
Under Smith, a claimant’s request for a religious exemption from a
neutral and generally applicable law usually will not be granted.198 When
courts apply rational basis review, the government almost always prevails
because the burden of proof under rational basis review is substantially less
demanding than the burden of proof under strict scrutiny.199 Under rational
basis review, the government must simply demonstrate that its policies are
rationally related to a legitimate interest, which it can almost always
prove.200
In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, business owners’
constitutional religious exemption claims are subject to rational basis
review under Smith.201 The Smith doctrine applies because the religious
claimant is seeking an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause from a
religion-neutral antidiscrimination law.202 However, the application of
Smith in these cases proves to be problematic. Since the rational basis
framework is so deferential to the government’s interests, the religious
194. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 465 (“[N]either the neutral and generally
applicable standard of Smith nor the substantial-burden standard of [state RFRAs] asks the
right questions or produces the right answers in a consistent manner.”).
195. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
196. See id. Prior to Smith, the Court analyzed religious exemptions claims under strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest.”); see also supra Part I.A. (explaining the standard of review under
the Free Exercise Clause after Smith).
197. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam); Roman Cath.
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per curiam); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
198. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[A] neutral and generally applicable law will usually
survive a constitutional free exercise challenge.”); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 897–99.
199. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 587 (explaining the government’s burden of
proof under rational basis review).
200. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding state
regulations of the sale of eyeglass frames under rational basis review).
201. See, e.g., Arlene II, 441 P.3d 1203, 1231–32 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-333,
2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.).
202. See id.; see also supra Part I.A (discussing free exercise jurisprudence after Smith).
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Because LGBTQIA+ public
claimants almost always lose.203
accommodation cases involve questions about fundamental religious
liberty, scholars in favor of religious exemptions criticize the Smith
framework for failing to account for the interests of the religious claimants
seeking exemptions.204
To get around the Smith hurdle, religious claimants have shifted efforts
toward attacking antidiscrimination statutes as not being neutral and
generally applicable.205 In doing so, religious claimants aim to convince
the court that it should apply strict scrutiny under Lukumi.206 To show that
a law is not neutral and generally applicable, claimants will look to see
whether the law has any type of existing secular exemptions.207 Typically,
the more secular exemptions a law has, the stronger the claimant’s
argument is that the government treats secular exemptions more favorably
than religious ones.208 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government
from favoring secular activity over religious activity.209
Religious claimants in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases are
usually unsuccessful in arguing that the government’s antidiscrimination
policies are not neutral and generally applicable.210 As previously
discussed, public accommodation laws apply to almost all public-facing
businesses with a limited number of exceptions.211 Courts have typically
203. See Mark R. Killenbeck, Pandora’s Cake, 72 ARK. L. REV. 769, 809 (2020) (“The
highly deferential standard articulated in Smith is almost certainly inadequate to the task of
balancing the competing interests posed by a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop.”); see also
Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 474 (discussing how Smith “insulate[s] from review
situations in which the government could provide an accommodation that satisfies the rights
of all parties, but is not required to do so”).
204. See Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free
Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 26 (2016) (proclaiming that First Amendment rights
are fundamental and deserving of the highest level of protection); see also Berg, supra note
50, at 109 (“[F]ree exercise of religion has an elevated place in . . . the modern constitutional
framework . . . .”).
205. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General
Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627,
628 (2003). This strategy has been termed the “key” toward bringing a successful
constitutional exemption claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 633. While there is a
separate area of legal scholarship addressing the topic of neutral and generally applicable
laws, this Note discusses this topic only in the context of highlighting Smith’s doctrinal
challenges.
206. As previously discussed, courts only apply strict scrutiny after Smith if the
challenged law is found to lack neutrality or not be generally applicable. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
207. See Laycock & Collis, supra note 204, at 5–6.
208. See Lund, supra note 205, at 638.
209. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam) (holding that
government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable “whenever they treat any
comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise”); Roman Cath. Diocese
of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (per curiam).
210. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 74 (N.M. 2013). But see
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (holding that Philadelphia’s
“non-discrimination requirement imposes a burden on CSS’s religious exercise and does not
qualify as generally applicable”).
211. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 642.
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concluded that public accommodation laws are neutral laws of general
applicability.212 Further, courts have found that a small number of secular
exemptions is not enough to show that the government has singled out
religion for disparate treatment in its public accommodation laws.213
While attacking the presumption of neutrality and general applicability
has worked in other free exercise cases,214 this strategy has usually not been
successful in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.215 As such,
religious claimants are effectively stuck under the Smith umbrella when
they bring constitutional religious exemption claims.216 Therefore, the
equality interest, embodied through the state’s antidiscrimination laws,
usually prevails over the religious liberty interest when religious exemption
claims are analyzed under Smith.
2. The State RFRAs Hurdle
Because Smith makes it difficult for a claimant to succeed on a
constitutional religious exemption claim, these individuals instead look to
bring their religious exemption claims under state RFRAs.217 State RFRAs
are a product of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,
in which the Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states.218 Most state
RFRAs mirror RFRA and reinstate the pre-Smith strict scrutiny test, as
applied in Yoder and the Sherbert Quartet, when the government
substantially burdens religion.219 In certain jurisdictions, there are state

212. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 572 (1995) (holding that public accommodations laws do not generally violate the First
Amendment); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, No. 19-1413, 2021 WL 3157635, at *13–14 (10th
Cir. July 26, 2021); Arlene II, 441 P.3d 1203, 1231 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-333,
2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.).
213. See, e.g., 303 Creative LLC, 2021 WL 3157635, at *15–17; Arlene II, 441 P.3d. at
1229–31; Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S. 3d 422, 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (“The fact that
some religious organizations and educational facilities are exempt from the statute’s public
accommodation provision does not, as petitioners claim, demonstrate that it is not neutral or
generally applicable.”).
214. See, e.g., Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam); Fraternal
Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366–67 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
Newark Police Department’s facial hair policy was not neutral and generally applicable
because it contained exceptions for medical reasons but not religious reasons).
215. See, e.g., Arlene II, 441 P.3d at 1229–30 (rejecting Stutzman’s argument that
Washington’s public accommodation law is not neutral and generally applicable).
216. See Lund, supra note 205, at 628.
217. See, e.g., Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 918 (Ariz.
2019) (“Here, Plaintiffs concede the [antidiscrimination] Ordinance is a facially neutral law
of general applicability. . . . As a result, their free exercise [exemption] claim is based solely
on [Arizona’s state RFRA].” (citations omitted)); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d
140, 162 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
218. 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). For more information on the passage of RFRA and its
implications, see supra Part I.A.
219. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs,
55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 474–77 (2010).
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RFRAs and public accommodation laws, which create a direct statutory
conflict.220
When strict scrutiny is applied, the religious claimant has a greater
chance of being granted an exemption, since the government must justify its
conduct by showing its means are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest.221 The government’s burden under strict scrutiny is significant.222
While the Smith test gives substantial deference to the state, the
compelling interest test places significant weight on the religious interest
and relatively little emphasis on the government’s interest in protecting
LGBTQIA+ rights.223 What makes things even more complicated is
courts’ and scholars’ disagreement over what the proper application of the
test is and, more specifically, what the correct formulation of the
government’s compelling interest is.224 Further, courts have different
understandings of how third-party harms should factor into their
analyses.225
C. Compelling Interests and Third-Party Harms Under State RFRAs
Expanding on the doctrinal challenges presented above, this section
focuses specifically on state RFRAs and discusses the disagreement among
courts and scholars over the purpose served by public accommodation law,
as well as the applicability of the third-party harm doctrine. In outlining
these disagreements, this section demonstrates how these different
understandings affect the compelling interest test under state RFRAs and
lead to inconsistent results in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.226
220. For example, Philadelphia has a public accommodation law that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1106 (2021),
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-195838
[https://perma.cc/4QFK-SYKP]. Pennsylvania has a state RFRA. See 71 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2401 (West 2021). The direct clash between these two laws is
illustrated in Fulton, as CSS also raised a religious exemption claim under Pennsylvania’s
state RFRA. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 162–65.
221. Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 496 (acknowledging that strict scrutiny is an “easier
standard for a religious objector to satisfy”).
222. See id.; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727–28 (2014)
(characterizing the state’s burden under RFRA as “exceptionally demanding”). Although
Hobby Lobby involved a claim under RFRA, the Supreme Court’s application of the
compelling interest test is helpful to consider when thinking about state RFRAs because they
closely track RFRA. See Lund, supra note 219, at 474–76.
223. Freeman, supra note 47, at 17 (“By applying strict judicial scrutiny . . . a preference
would be given to religion over non-religion in determining whether exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability should be recognized.”); see also Laycock, supra note
12, at 378 (charactering state RFRAs as having a “substantial thumb on the scale in favor of
religious liberty”).
224. See Movsesian, supra note 28, at 715–16 (discussing the significant difficulties
presented by the compelling interest test); Killenbeck, supra note 203, at 809 (same); see
also infra Part II.C.1.
225. See infra Part II.C.2.
226. While this section is focused specifically on state RFRAs, as discussed previously,
courts also apply strict scrutiny when analyzing certain constitutional claims under the Free
Exercise Clause. See supra Part I.A (discussing Lukumi and Sherbert).
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Part II.C.1 presents the various understandings of the aims of public
accommodation laws, noting how each different purpose affects the
analysis under the compelling interest test. Part II.C.2 explains the
third-party harm doctrine and discusses points of disagreement among
courts and scholars over the role third-party harms should play in the
compelling interest test.
1. Market Access or Protection of Personal Dignity: Is Your Interest
Compelling?
Most state RFRAs call for the government to satisfy strict scrutiny when
it substantially burdens religious exercise.227 The government must show
that the law furthers a compelling government interest and is the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest.228 In LGBTQIA+ public
accommodation cases where religious claimants are seeking exemptions
from antidiscrimination laws, the two-prong test is as follows: (1) whether
the antidiscrimination law furthers a compelling government interest and
(2) whether denying the claimant’s request for a religious exemption, and
applying the law uniformly to his or her conduct, is the least restrictive
means of furthering the compelling governmental interest.
Regarding the compelling interest question, proponents of religious
exemptions argue that the overall purpose of public accommodation laws is
to ensure material access to goods and services.229 These scholars contend
that public accommodation laws are “justified where there are threats to the
ability of gay citizens to participate fully and meaningfully in the
market.”230 In other words, public accommodation laws are a tool for the
government to increase access to consumer markets and improve economic
opportunities.231
Others claim that antidiscrimination laws target “more than material
inequality.”232 The compelling interest served by these laws goes beyond
fostering access to the market and centers on eradicating the
“institutionalized humiliation” that is the central harm of discrimination.233
In support of their position, these scholars point out that the Supreme Court
227. See, e.g., Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919 (Ariz.
2019); see also supra Part II.B.2 (outlining the compelling interest test under state RFRAs).
228. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 919–20.
229. See Koppelman, supra note 125, at 133; see also Berg, supra note 50, at 141; Oman,
supra note 125.
230. Oman, supra note 125.
231. See Koppelman, supra note 125, at 133 (“Antidiscrimination law can have a
powerful effect on economic opportunity.”).
232. Sepper, supra note 126, at 153; see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at
158 (arguing that the market access position “attacks a fundamental aspect of civil rights
doctrine and rejects decades of experience with public accommodations laws”).
233. Sepper, supra note 126, at 154; see also Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights
Commission at 56–58, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4838416, at *56–59 (arguing that Colorado has a compelling
interest in applying its antidiscrimination law to protect against the dignitary harms that
follow from denials of services based on sexual orientation).

2021]

LGBTQIA+ PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION CASES

289

has recognized the dignitary harm caused by discrimination in both its
public accommodation234 and LGBTQIA+ civil rights cases.235 More
importantly, the Court has long held that in light of these dignitary harms,
the government has a compelling interest in enforcing public
accommodation laws in a commercial setting, despite religious
objections.236
After formulating a compelling interest, courts will turn to the second
portion of the strict scrutiny test: the least restrictive means analysis.237 If
courts understand the government’s compelling interest in passing
antidiscrimination laws as market access, it follows that uniform
enforcement of the law is not the least restrictive means of achieving the
government’s goals if the “same-sex couple seeking goods or services . . .
can readily obtain comparable goods or services from other providers.”238
Put differently, the government would not meet its burden of proof under
strict scrutiny because a less restrictive means exists—requiring the
same-sex couple to find another willing provider—to further its market
access goal.239 Because of the existence of market alternatives, religious
claimants contend that they should not be required to serve LGBTQIA+
couples in violation of their religious beliefs.240
However, if courts frame the compelling interest served by public
accommodation laws as protecting individual dignity by eradicating
discrimination, then the government has a stronger argument that the least
restrictive means of furthering its goal is to require uniform enforcement of
the public accommodation law and, thus, to deny exemptions.241 Some
234. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (holding that the “fundamental object” of
antidiscrimination law is to prevent the “deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments”).
235. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court clearly stated that the state has the authority to
“protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face
discrimination when they seek goods or services.” 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). The Court
expressed the same sentiment three years earlier in Obergefell, emphasizing that same-sex
couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
236. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 159–60; see also Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 260–61; Brief of
Amici Curiae Public Accommodation Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 1–3, 27–
33, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127312, at *1–
4, *27–34 [hereinafter Brief of Public Accommodation Law Scholars].
237. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919–20 (Ariz. 2019); see
also supra Parts I.A, II.B.2.
238. See Brief of Douglas Laycock et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574),
2015 WL 1048450, at *5.
239. Berg, supra note 50, at 137; see also Sepper, supra note 107, at 669.
240. See Berg, supra note 50, at 138. But cf. Brief of Public Accommodation Law
Scholars, supra note 236, at 33 (“If [the petitioner’s] view [on market access] were correct,
Colorado’s law would apply only in those locales where alternatives are unavailable to
particular protected classes—a standard that would be unworkable for businesses, customers,
and courts.”).
241. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 669. There is an open question of how the
government can demonstrate that requiring uniformity is the least restrictive means of
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scholars have taken the position that the government’s interest in preventing
dignitary harm is so compelling that religious exemptions should rarely, if
ever, be granted.242 To that end, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“there may be instances in which a need for uniformity precludes the
recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws.”243
2. Should Religious Exemptions Be Granted When a Third Party Is
Harmed?
In addition to disagreeing about the purpose served by public
accommodation laws, courts and scholars also differ in their understandings
of how third-party harms244 should factor into the strict scrutiny analysis.245
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.,246 legal scholarship has devoted significant attention to whether, or to
what extent, courts can grant religious exemptions that impose harms on
third parties.247 In Hobby Lobby, the majority found that when applying
RFRA, “courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
reaching its compelling ends. As such, each case requires a careful analysis of various
factors, including the government’s stated goals. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at
2581 (“If granting a religious accommodation would harm those protected by the
antidiscrimination law or undermine societal values and goals the statute promotes, then
unencumbered enforcement of the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving the
govern-government’s [sic] compelling ends.”).
242. See, e.g., Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws:
Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 192 (2015); Sepper, supra note 126,
at 165 (arguing that LGBTQIA+ Americans “may face a prolonged period of continued
discrimination across . . . public accommodations” if religious exemptions are continually
granted); Lim & Melling, supra note 123, at 724 (“[Courts] should greet any calls for
exemptions motivated by religious beliefs with great skepticism.”).
243. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436
(2006); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982) (finding that the
government’s interest in “assuring mandatory and continuous participation in . . . the social
security system is very high”).
244. In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, the third-party harm would be the harm
suffered by the LGBTQIA+ couple when the religious business owner declines to provide
services on religious grounds.
245. The third-party harm doctrine presents interesting Establishment Clause questions.
See, e.g., Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, The Establishment Clause, and
Third-Party Harms, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 934 (2019). However, this Note does not
address these issues.
246. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). In Hobby Lobby, David and Barbara Green, owners of Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., a for-profit corporation, challenged the application of the Affordable
Care Act’s contraception mandate as a violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs. Id.
at 689–90, 703–04. The Greens brought their claim under RFRA. Id.
247. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 157. Compare NELSON TEBBE,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 49–51 (2017) (arguing that the third-party
harm doctrine is rooted in First Amendment jurisprudence), and Frederick Mark Gedicks &
Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 357–60
(2014) (same), with Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harms,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Oct. 2016, at 50, 51 (criticizing the third-party harm doctrine), and
Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 39, 45–46 (2014) (same).
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accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,”248 and “that
consideration will often inform the analysis of the Government’s
compelling interest and the availability of a less restrictive means of
advancing that interest.”249 The concurring and dissenting justices
articulated a similar principle, citing the Court’s free exercise precedents.250
Scholars have questioned whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Hobby
Lobby creates a firm rule that religious exemptions may not be granted if
nonbeneficiaries are harmed.251 Even if there is no categorical rule that
religious exemptions are prohibited when third parties are harmed, at
minimum, there is support for the position that courts should consider the
harm to a nonbeneficiary when deciding whether to grant a religious
exemption.252 To that end, Professors Nelson Tebbe and Frederick Mark
Gedicks have proposed interesting frameworks for courts to use when
considering the effect of third-party harms.253

248. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005)).
249. Id.; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and
Baselines, Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 323, 323–24 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (outlining the Supreme Court’s
discussion of third-party harms in Hobby Lobby).
250. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined in relevant part by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and
Sotomayor, concluded that religious accommodations may “not significantly impinge on the
interests of third parties.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 745 & n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(first citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); then citing Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); and then citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720, 722). Justice
Kennedy similarly concluded that religious exercise may not “unduly restrict other
persons . . . in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 739
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also TEBBE, supra note 247, at 55–59 (arguing that the thirdparty harm principle the Supreme Court articulated in Hobby Lobby is rooted in First
Amendment jurisprudence).
251. See Gene Schaerr & Michael Worley, The “Third Party Harm” Rule: Law or
Wishful Thinking?, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 646 (2019) (“[T]he third-party harm
‘rule’ is not ‘law’ under any reasonable understanding of the word.”); Berg, supra note 247,
at 52 (pointing out that a number of “familiar, accepted religious accommodations involve
clear effects on individual third parties”). But see Nelson Tebbe et al., How Much May
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATES 215, 217 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017) (“But if the principle of avoiding
harm to others is not absolute, that raises a crucial question: how much burden-shifting to
third parties is constitutionally permissible?”).
252. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 n.37; see also NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at
2531–33 (discussing how the third-party harm principle shaped the Court’s analysis in
Hobby Lobby and how it is an “integral” part of the RFRA inquiry). In her Hobby Lobby
dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of also considering third-party harms
when dealing with exemption questions under the Free Exercise Clause. Hobby Lobby, 573
U.S. at 745 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
253. Professor Tebbe adopts Title VII’s “undue hardship” test as the baseline for
determining “how much harm to others can be tolerated before a religious accommodation
becomes impermissible.” Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 219. Professor Gedicks, on the
other hand, proposes “materiality”—derived from tort and contract law—as the appropriate
standard for distinguishing third-party burdens that should preclude exemptions from
burdens that should not. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 249, at 338.
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However, courts are not uniformly considering third-party harms when
applying strict scrutiny under state RFRAs.254 Indeed, the biggest critique
of the third-party harm doctrine is that it does not take into account the
dignitary harm suffered by the religious business owners if they are forced
to serve LGBTQIA+ couples.255 The religious business owners seeking
exemptions sincerely believe that they are “being asked to defy God’s will,”
and as a result, will also suffer dignitary harm if they are forced to act
contrary to their religious beliefs.256 Opponents of the third-party harm
doctrine emphasize that the compelling interest test is “ultimately a
balancing test” and that courts, therefore, cannot simply consider
third-party harms without addressing the harm inflicted on the business
owner if an exemption is not granted.257
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix258 is an LGBTQIA+ public
accommodation case that clearly illustrates the doctrinal challenges in this
area of the law. In Brush & Nib Studio, Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski,
designers of custom wedding invitations, sought a religious exemption from
Phoenix’s Human Relations Ordinance259 (the “Ordinance”).260 The
Ordinance prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of
public accommodation.261 Duka and Koski, therefore, would have been
required to create custom invitations for same-sex wedding ceremonies in
violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs.262
Because of Smith, Duka and Koski based their religious exemption claim
solely on Arizona’s state RFRA.263 In applying strict scrutiny under
Arizona’s state RFRA, the majority formulated the city’s compelling
interest as “eradicating discrimination.”264 However, the majority went on

254. See Melling, supra note 242, at 189 (“Less discussed, yet essential to the
conversation, are the harms resulting from accommodations . . . .”).
255. See Berg, supra note 247, at 57; see also Laycock, supra note 12, at 378 (arguing
that proponents of the third-party harm doctrine “never acknowledge the dignitary harm on
the religious side”); Brief of Christian Legal Society, supra note 12, at 30 (“The Court must
also consider the dignitary harm to the religious objectors . . . .”).
256. Laycock, supra note 12, at 378; Brief of Christian Legal Society, supra note 12, at
31.
257. Laycock, supra note 12, at 378. But cf. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 2584–
85 (emphasizing that courts should “examine carefully the . . . material and dignitary effects
of an accommodation” when adjudicating claims under state RFRAs); Denley, supra note 9,
at 226 (arguing that the best way to address religious exemption claims is to “weigh the
burden on the one claiming the freedom of religious expression . . . against the burden on the
third party”).
258. 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
259. PHOENIX, ARIZ., CITY CODE ch. 18 (2021).
260. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 895–96.
261. Id. at 898. Brush & Nib Studio was considered a public accommodation under the
Ordinance. Id. at 899.
262. Id. at 899–900.
263. Id. at 918; see also supra Part II.B.1 (addressing how religious claimants have
looked for ways to work around Smith).
264. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 922. The majority did not take a firm position on
the market access versus dignitary harms debate but instead concluded that the ordinance
“generally” serves the compelling purpose of eradicating discrimination. Id. The majority
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to conclude that the “interest is not sufficiently overriding to force [Duka
and Koski] to create custom wedding invitations celebrating same-sex
marriage in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs” and granted
the religious exemption.265 In doing so, the court determined that uniform
enforcement of the Ordinance was not the least restrictive means for the
city to achieve its nondiscrimination purpose.266 To reach this conclusion,
the court relied on the premise that the same-sex couple may obtain
wedding-related services from other vendors.267
The dissent, by contrast, formulated the city’s compelling interest as
preventing the couple from experiencing the dignitary harm arising from
the denial of services.268 The dissent concluded that the Ordinance’s
uniform application would have been the least restrictive means of
furthering the city’s goals and therefore would have supported the denial of
the exemption.269 In criticizing the majority’s application of the compelling
interest test, Judge Scott Bales proclaimed that “protections like the
Ordinance have been put in place to ensure that we do not repeat the denials
of access and opportunity that plagued our state in its infancy.”270
Brush & Nib Studio highlights why current religious exemption doctrine
inadequately addresses the broader questions presented in LGBTQIA+
public accommodation cases.271 Because of the Smith hurdle, Duka and
Koski based their religious exemption claim on state law.272 The Arizona
Supreme Court, therefore, applied strict scrutiny but ended up with polar
opposite results.273 The majority did not consider the harms suffered by the
LGBTQIA+ couple in its analysis.274 The dissent, on the other hand,
emphasized the harm the couple suffered but barely addressed the harm

did, however, rely on the premise of the market access theory as part of its least restrictive
means analysis. See id. at 936 (Bales, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 922, 926 (majority opinion).
266. See id. at 923 (“[T]he purpose of the Ordinance is properly served by permitting a
narrow exemption for Plaintiff’s creation of . . . custom wedding invitations.”).
267. See id. at 936 (Bales, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (“The prohibition on discrimination not only promotes equal access, but also
serves to eradicate . . . the attendant humiliation and stigma that result if businesses can
selectively treat some customers as second-class citizens.”).
269. See id. at 936–37.
270. Id. at 937. Judge Bales catalogued other instances where Arizonians have been
denied access to goods and services “based on invidious discrimination.” Id.
271. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 476.
272. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 918.
273. With or without Smith in place, state court judges may still reach conflicting
outcomes when interpreting their own state RFRAs. However, Brush & Nib Studio
illustrates the disagreements among courts over the purpose served by antidiscrimination
laws and the significance of third-party harms. More importantly, it underscores how a more
streamlined framework may help to reconcile these different positions, even if the Supreme
Court decides to overturn Smith.
274. See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 936 (Bales, J., dissenting).
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Duka and Koski would suffer if they were required to make invitations for a
same-sex wedding.275
Because the central conflict in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases
is how to balance religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ equality interests and
because the Smith and state RFRA standards do not have a consistent way
of reconciling these interests, a departure from the standard doctrinal
framework is warranted.276
III. AN IMPROVED COMPELLING INTEREST TEST
In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, there are two fundamental
interests at stake: religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.277 Although the
Supreme Court has recognized the inherent tension between religious
liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights, it has not fully addressed the conflict in
these cases because of Smith.278 While Fulton presented the Court with a
ripe opportunity to reconsider its decision in Smith, the Court sidestepped
the question.279
Absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, the religious
exemption framework in place is insufficient for balancing the competing
interests in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.280 To address the
inadequacies of the current framework, this part proposes a streamlined
compelling interest test lower courts may use when analyzing claims for
religious exemptions. By applying this test, courts can properly account for
third-party harms and strike an appropriate balance between the rights of
religious business owners and the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community.
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited Smith, this framework is
specifically designed for courts applying strict scrutiny under state
RFRAs.281 Part III.A proposes that courts should formulate the state’s
compelling interest in passing antidiscrimination laws as protecting against
dignitary harms. Part III.B argues that, in light of this compelling interest,
courts should consider the degree of third-party harms in their least
275. Id. at 923–24 (majority opinion) (“Here, under the dissent’s least restrictive means
test, the City’s nondiscrimination purpose simply overrides all conflicting individual rights
and liberties.”).
276. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 475–76.
277. See supra Part II.A (outlining the inherent clash between liberty and equality in
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases).
278. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing how the Court did not address Smith in
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton).
279. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1928 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (critiquing the majority for “circumnavigat[ing]” the question of whether to
overrule Smith).
280. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 465; see also supra Part II (explaining the
doctrinal challenges presented by Smith and state RFRAs).
281. If the Supreme Court decides to overrule Smith and adopt heightened scrutiny for
religious exemption claims under the Free Exercise Clause, courts can easily modify and
apply this framework in the free exercise context as well. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 745 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how “[a] balanced
approach is all the more in order” when religious exemption claims involve the Free
Exercise Clause, as opposed to statutory protections).
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restrictive means analysis, as guided by Professor Nelson Tebbe’s “undue
hardship” standard.282
A. States’ Compelling Interest in Protecting LGBTQIA+ Americans
As previously discussed, claimants in LGBTQIA+ public
accommodation cases typically seek religious exemptions from
antidiscrimination law under state RFRAs.283 Many state RFRAs provide
that courts must analyze religious exemption claims under strict scrutiny.284
A government policy can survive strict scrutiny “only if it advances
‘interests of the highest order’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve those
interests.”285 In applying strict scrutiny, courts first formulate the
government’s compelling interest.286
Lower courts are currently in disagreement over what government
interests public accommodation laws serve, particularly whether the laws
aim to improve market access or to protect consumers from dignitary harm
if they are denied services.287 Relatedly, courts also have different
understandings about whether third-party harms should be factored into the
compelling interest analysis.288 However, free exercise and RFRA
jurisprudence both strongly support considering the impact of third-party
harms when analyzing religious exemption claims.289 Given that state
RFRAs closely track the federal RFRA,290 this section argues that it is
indeed appropriate for courts to consider third-party harms in their
compelling interest analyses.
Accordingly, courts should understand the state as having a compelling
interest in preventing LGBTQIA+ Americans from dignitary harms
stemming from being turned away from a place of public accommodation.
While antidiscrimination laws certainly have a goal of expanding market
access to individuals who historically have been denied economic
opportunities, the true purpose of antidiscrimination law is rooted in
protecting human dignity.291 Both Congress and the Supreme Court have
recognized this overarching goal.292 When applying the compelling interest
282. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (outlining Professor Tebbe’s undue
hardship framework).
283. See supra Part II.B.2.
284. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164.
285. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (quoting Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
286. See id.
287. See Sepper, supra note 126, at 153; see also supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the
different ways courts formulate the state’s purpose in passing antidiscrimination laws).
288. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 157; see also supra Part II.C.2.
289. See supra notes 247–53 and accompanying text.
290. Lund, supra note 76, at 164.
291. See Sepper, supra note 126, at 154 (arguing that the eradication of institutionalized
humiliation is the “primary aim of antidiscrimination law”).
292. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 2575 (“Just as Congress took the social
meaning of refusals into consideration in fashioning antidiscrimination laws governing
public accommodations, so too should the social meaning of refusals factor in judgments
about whether and how to grant persons religious exemptions from laws of general
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test in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, courts should recognize
this purpose and formulate the state’s compelling interest in passing
antidiscrimination laws as protecting LGBTQIA+ individuals from
suffering harm to their personhood.
B. Undue Hardship: Grounds for Denying Religious Exemptions
After formulating the government’s compelling interest, courts turn to
the narrow tailoring portion of the strict scrutiny test.293 Legislation is
narrowly tailored if it is the least restrictive means of achieving the
In LGBTQIA+ public
government’s compelling interest.294
accommodation cases, courts consider whether the antidiscrimination law,
as applied to the religious claimant, represents the least restrictive means of
achieving the government’s compelling interest.295 In building off the
compelling interest part of the test, the third-party harm doctrine should be
incorporated into the narrow tailoring analysis.296
Professor Tebbe’s “undue hardship” standard is a way for courts to
incorporate the third-party harm doctrine into their least restrictive means
analyses. Although Professor Tebbe did not structure his undue hardship
proposal in the context of the compelling interest test, he was primarily
concerned with finding a threshold standard for determining when the
existence of a third-party harm outweighs extending a religious
exemption.297 Since this balancing is exactly what courts are doing when
they apply strict scrutiny, Professor Tebbe’s undue hardship framework is
an attractive and workable standard that courts can use in this context to
account for third-party harms.
Professor Tebbe derives his undue hardship framework from
employment discrimination law.298 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” for the
religious observances of their workers, unless doing so would result in
“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”299 The
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of Title VII’s religious

application.”); see also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing how the Supreme Court has recognized
the government’s interest in protecting individual dignity rights).
293. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.1.
294. See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 923 (Ariz. 2019)
(citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014)).
295. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d,
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
296. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 495 (“If the state’s compelling interest is
understood to include protecting [LGBTQIA+ dignitary and equality rights], then the narrow
tailoring analysis changes as well.”); see also NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 2584–
85.
297. See Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 217 (“In other words, once it has been
established that a third party has suffered some kind of burden as a consequence of a
religious accommodation, how much of a burden is too much?”).
298. See id.
299. Id. at 220 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
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accommodation provision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.300
There, an airline employee requested Saturdays off to observe the Sabbath,
as required by his faith.301 The airline was unable to accommodate his
request, mainly because of how days off were apportioned under its
collective bargaining agreement.302 The Court explained that, for purposes
of Title VII, an undue hardship imposes “more than a de minimis cost” on
the operation of the employer’s business.303 To help discern de minimis
costs, the Court considered both economic and noneconomic factors,
including staffing changes, wage increases, and lost efficiency in other
departments.304 After considering these factors, the Court held that the
company would incur an undue hardship if it was required to depart from
its contractually mandated system to accommodate the employee’s
religion.305
In his third-party harm theory, Professor Tebbe adopts the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of undue hardship in Hardison, explaining that “the
undue hardship standard . . . tracks the concern with religious
accommodations that shift harms to other private citizens.”306 Professor
Tebbe contends that religious accommodations should be denied if they
would impose more than de minimis costs on third parties and, conversely,
should be granted when they would impose less than de minimis costs on
third parties.307
In incorporating Professor Tebbe’s undue hardship framework into the
least restrictive means analysis, courts should consider whether the
same-sex couple experiences an undue hardship when the religious business
owner refuses service. If the same-sex couple experiences an undue
hardship, uniform enforcement of the public accommodation law is the
least restrictive means of furthering the government’s goal of protecting
LGBTQIA+ Americans from suffering dignitary harm. The court should
thus deny the religious exemption. On the other hand, if the same-sex
couple does not experience an undue hardship, uniform enforcement is not
the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest, and the
court should grant the religious exemption.

300. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
301. See id. at 67–68.
302. Id. at 68.
303. Id. at 84.
304. See id. at 84–85; see also Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.
2009) (“Both economic and non-economic costs can pose an undue hardship upon
employers . . . .”); Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam) (considering whether “additional accommodations would have impeded the
company’s operations, burdened other employees, and violated its seniority system”), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021).
305. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 83 (“TWA was not required by Title VII to carve
out a special exception to its seniority system in order to help Hardison to meet his religious
obligations.”).
306. Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 228.
307. See id. at 217.

298

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

The Supreme Court’s de minimis cost analysis from Hardison, as
interpreted by Professor Tebbe, is a helpful baseline for courts to reference
to determine whether a couple experiences an undue hardship.308 To
determine whether the harm to the couple amounts to an undue hardship,
courts should consult both economic and noneconomic factors, focusing on
“the fact as well as the magnitude of the alleged undue hardship.”309 By
conducting a fact-specific inquiry, courts can properly weigh the interests
of the religious claimant against the interests of the LGBTQIA+ couple.310
Turning first to economic factors, courts should examine the financial
costs the LGBTQIA+ couple would incur in looking for an alternative
provider.311 In thinking about these costs, courts should consider the
following questions: Is there another provider nearby, or would the couple
need to travel to find another provider? Will the goods or services be more
expensive from the other provider? Will there be additional delivery or
shipping fees?312 If the LGBTQIA+ couple can obtain the same product or
service with relatively little financial burden, there is less of an undue
hardship and the scales tip in favor of granting the religious business owner
an exemption. But, if there is a substantial financial burden placed on the
couple to find another provider, there is more of an undue hardship, which
supports denial of the exemption.
However, courts should not make their decisions based on monetary
costs alone; they should also consider nonmonetary factors. An important
nonmonetary factor courts should consider is whether the LGBTQIA+
couple had a prior long-standing relationship with the vendor or if the
LGBTQIA+ couple interacted with the vendor as part of a one-time
arm’s-length transaction.313 If the LGBTQIA+ couple had a pre-existing
308. Courts and scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s de minimis test as
disfavoring religious claimants seeking accommodations under Title VII. See, e.g., Small,
952 F.3d at 829 (Thapar, J., concurring) (observing that religious claimants are harmed by
“decisions like Hardison”); Storslee, supra note 245, at 936 (arguing that “the Court in
Hardison focused solely on the cost side of the equation with no regard for the significance
of the [religious] activity”). This Note adopts Professor Tebbe’s interpretation of the undue
hardship standard as part of a context-specific balancing test. See Tebbe et al., supra note
251, at 223 (“Even though the Supreme Court’s de minimis interpretation of the undue
hardship standard sounds uncompromising, it has, in fact, been applied in ways that are more
balanced.”).
309. Webb, 562 F.3d at 260; see also Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239,
1243 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (observing how courts must consider “the particular
factual context of each case” when deciding whether a religious accommodation imposes an
undue hardship (quoting Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d
397, 400 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979))).
310. See Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 216–17. This section rejects the position set
forth by certain scholars that the presence of third-party harms automatically warrants the
denial of religious exemptions. See Melling, supra note 242, at 191–92.
311. The government has the burden of proof to produce evidence as to each of these
monetary and nonmonetary factors.
312. Courts should consider any financial burden placed on the LGBTQIA+ couple to
find a substitute provider. This list of factors is not exhaustive.
313. See Arlene I, 389 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138
S. Ct. 2671 (2018). Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed were customers at Arlene’s Flowers for
over nine years and considered Stutzman, the owner, to be “[their] florist.” Id. (alteration in
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relationship with the vendor, it is very likely that the rejection caused
greater harm, as compared to a situation where the couple did not have a
personal connection with the vendor.314
In addition, courts should consider whether the vendor treated the
LGBTQIA+ couple with any type of animus. Did the vendor clearly
explain why it was denying services or simply turn the couple away?315
Did the vendor offer to help the couple find an alternative provider?316
Relatedly, courts can also look at whether there was backlash from the local
community against the vendor, the couple, or both parties.317
After considering both monetary and nonmonetary factors, courts will be
able to determine whether the harm to the couple results in an undue
hardship. Only if the court determines that the third-party harm is not an
undue hardship should it grant the religious claimant’s request for an
exemption. Otherwise, the exemption should be denied in favor of the
uniform enforcement of the antidiscrimination law. Put another way, if the
third-party harm amounts to an undue hardship, then the uniform
enforcement of the law to all public-facing businesses is the least restrictive
means of reaching the state’s goal of protecting against dignitary harms,
and the exemption should not be granted.
The compelling interest test presented above, as guided by the third-party
harm doctrine and the undue hardship principle, can help to resolve the
disagreements present in a case like Brush & Nib Studio. As previously
discussed, the Arizona Supreme Court in Brush & Nib Studio was starkly
divided over whether to grant Duka and Koski, designers of custom
wedding invitations, a religious exemption from Phoenix’s public
accommodation law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.318 The majority ruled that Duka and Koski were entitled to an
exemption under Arizona’s state RFRA.319

original); see also Berg, supra note 10, at 232 (noting the significance of a long-standing
relationship with a vendor as opposed to an arm’s-length relationship).
314. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 377.
315. For example, a catering hall in Texas responded to an email inquiry from a
LGBTQIA+ couple stating that they “shouldn’t bother visiting [the venue] because a gay
wedding would be against God’s ‘plan and design for marriage.’” Sabrina Rojas Weiss,
Wedding Venue Rejects Gay Couple, Arguing Marriage Equality Goes Against God’s Plan,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/the-knot-removes-texas-listing-after-venue-refuses-to-host-gaywedding_n_
5c50da4ee4b0f43e410bfce5 [https://perma.cc/ECA6-4TQ4].
316. See, e.g., Arlene I, 389 P.3d at 549; Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868,
1876 (2021) (noting that CSS would have directed the same-sex couple to “one of the more
than 20 other agencies in the City . . . which currently certify same-sex couples [as foster
parents]”).
317. For example, Jack Phillips, the Christian baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop, allegedly
experienced harassment and received death threats. See Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Colorado Baker:
Death Threats and Hate for Refusing to Make Gay Wedding Cake, FOX NEWS (June 29,
2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/colorado-baker-death-threats-and-hate-forrefusing-to-make-gay-wedding-cake [https://perma.cc/N2AZ-ZVNA].
318. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 900 (Ariz. 2019).
319. See id. at 926.
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If the majority had considered the harm suffered by the same-sex couple
when formulating its compelling interest and employed the undue hardship
standard in its least restrictive means analysis, it may have come to a
different conclusion about whether to grant the exemption. The dissenting
judges may have also reached an alternative outcome if they had both
looked more closely at costs associated with the couple’s search for a
different wedding card designer and considered whether Duka and Koski
offered to help the couple find another wedding card designer.320
By incorporating Professor Tebbe’s undue hardship framework into the
compelling interest test, courts can more equitably balance the interests of
the claimants seeking religious exemptions against the interests of the
LGBTQIA+ couples that are denied services. This streamlined framework
also resolves the disagreements among courts about how and when to
consider third-party harms in deciding whether to grant religious
exemptions to antidiscrimination laws. In adopting this balanced approach,
courts are better equipped to navigate the challenging questions at issue in
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.
CONCLUSION
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases represent an inherent tension
between two important values in American society—liberty and equality.
While the United States has a longstanding commitment to religious
freedom, its Constitution also guarantees all Americans equal protection
under the law. State and local governments have greatly expanded
protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans, but these protections conflict with
the way certain Americans choose to exercise their religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on this conflict because of
Smith, and it circumvented an opportunity to address the broader questions
in Fulton. Whether or not the Supreme Court decides to overrule Smith,
state courts should attempt to reconcile these two competing principles by
incorporating third-party harms and the undue hardship framework into
their compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses. While this
judicial framework is not a complete solution to the underlying cultural and
social conflicts in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, utilizing the
framework is one way for courts to attempt to balance the law’s competing
commitments to equality and religious freedom.

320. See id. at 923 (criticizing the dissent for “focusing exclusively on the impact an
exemption might have on same-sex couples” and not considering Duka’s and Koski’s free
exercise rights).

